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Abstract
In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional
game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value
of matrix games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as
well as the method that was described in von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic
characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games.
1 Introduction
Classical game theory makes a radical distinction between non-cooperative
games and cooperative games. Usually, non-cooperative games are defined
as games that do not permit enforceable agreements among players. This
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is contrast to cooperative games, in which enforceable agreements are pos-
sible. However, we think that the point of view adopted in van Damme
and Furth (2002) reflects the difference between non-cooperative games and
cooperative games more accurately. They write:
”The terminology that is used sometimes gives rise to confusion;
it is not the case that in non-cooperative games players do not
wish to cooperate and that in cooperative games players automat-
ically do so. The difference instead is in the level of detail of the
model; non-cooperative models assume that all the possibilities
for cooperation have been included as formal moves in the game,
while cooperative models are ’incomplete’ and allow players to
act outside of the detailed rules that have been specified.”
This description is, in fact, more in accordance with the approach in von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Given a non-cooperative game, they
formulate a cooperative game that describes for each coalition the benefits
that this coalition can secure for its members, independently of the actions
taken by the players outside the coalition. Hence, the cooperative-game
description abstracts away from the details of the non-cooperative game
and collapses those into simple numbers, one for each coalition of players.
For a coalition of players to secure the benefits (or worth of the coalition) for
its members, these members will most likely have to coordinate their actions
and this in itself will generally require them to act outside the detailed rules
of the non-cooperative game. To more clearly reflect the interpretations
provided above, we prefer to use the terminology strategic game (instead of
non-cooperative game) and coalitional game (instead of cooperative game).
The main objective of the current paper is to highlight the connection
between strategic games and coalitional games. We do so by providing
axiomatic foundations for two procedures that associate a coalitional game
with each strategic game. The first procedure we study is that introduced in
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), which defines the worth of a coalition
of players S to be the value of the mixed extension of the zero-sum game
between coalition S on the one hand and the coalition N \S consisting of all
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the other players on the other hand. In this zero-sum game, coalition N \S
tries to keep the payoff to coalition S as low as possible, while coalition S
tries to maximize its payoff. We also introduce a second procedure, which
defines the worth of a coalition S to be the lower value of the zero-sum
game between coalition S and coalition N \ S. The benefit of considering
the lower value of the game instead of the value of its mixed extension is
that the former requires no use of mixed strategies, whereas the latter does.
Hence, in situations where the use of mixed strategies is not plausible, the
procedure using the lower value will provide a more plausible method to
determine the benefits that each coalition can secure for its members.
To provide axiomatic foundations for these two procedures we start by
looking into axiomatic characterizations of the values of mixed extensions
of matrix games and of the lower values of matrix games, using the charac-
terizations of the value by Vilkas (1963) and Tijs (1981) as starting points.
We point out that there are papers that propose procedures to associate
coalitional games with strategic games that are quite different from the
ones we study in the current paper. Harsanyi (1963), Myerson (1991) and
Bergantin˜os and Garc´ıa-Jurado (1995) are some of these papers. All of
these take an approach that involves the Nash equilibrium concept rather
than the value or lower value. Myerson (1978) is a paper that is remotely
related to the current one. It studies the role of threats in strategic games
in which players are assumed to cooperate. Finally, we remark that we do
consider only situations where utilities are transferable between the players
in a coalition. Procedures to associate NTU-games with strategic games
were proposed in Aumann (1961, 1967). Aumann’s work was continued in
Borm and Tijs (1992).
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we provide defi-
nitions related to matrix games and we develop axiomatic characterizations
of the value and the lower value of matrix games. In section 3, we include
definitions related to strategic games and coalitional games and we study
methods to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. We pro-
vide axiomatic chracterizations of the method defined in von Neumann and
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Morgenstern (1944) as well as a newly-defined method that is based on the
lower value.
2 Values of matrix games
In this section, we concentrate on matrix games. We define and develop
axiomatic characterizations of both the value of matrix games and the lower
value of matrix games. These axiomatizations will be used in the next
section to construct axiomatic characterizations of methods that associate
coalitional games with strategic games.
A matrix game is a two-person zero-sum game (M,N,A) in which M =
{1, . . . ,m} and N = {1, . . . , n} are the strategy sets of players 1 and 2,
respectively, and A = [aij ]i∈M, j∈N is an m× n matrix of real numbers. If
player 1 chooses strategy i ∈ M and player 2 chooses strategy j ∈ N , then
player 2 pays aij to player 1, so player 1 has a payoff of aij and player 2
has a payoff of −aij . For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the matrix game
(M,N,A) simply as A.
For a matrix game A, the mixed extension of A, denoted by E(A), is a
two-person zero-sum game in which the strategy set of player 1 is
Sm = {x ∈ Rm | xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈M,∑
i∈M
xi = 1},
i.e., player 1 chooses a probability distribution on his strategies, and the
strategy set of player 2 is similarly defined by
Sn = {y ∈ Rn | yj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N,∑
j∈N
yj = 1}.
If player 1 chooses x ∈ Sm and player 2 chooses y ∈ Sn, the (expected)
payoff to player 1 is xTAy (or
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N xi yj aij) and that to player 2 is
−xTAy.1
The value of a matrix game is defined through its mixed extension using
the lower and upper values. The lower and upper values of E(A), V (E(A))
1xT denotes the transpose of x.
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and V (E(A)), are defined as:
V (E(A)) := max
x∈Sm
min
y∈Sn
xTAy
V (E(A)) := min
y∈Sn
max
x∈Sm
xTAy.
At the basis of these definitions is that player 1 wants to maximize xTAy
and player 2 wants to minimize it. By choosing an appropriate x ∈ Sm,
player 1 can make sure he gets at least the lower value. Similarly, by choos-
ing an appropriate y ∈ Sn, player 2 can make sure he does not have to
pay more than the the upper value. Note that it follows easily from these
definitions that V (E(A)) ≤ V (E(A)). The classical minimax theorem (cf.
von Neumann (1928)) asserts that for every matrix game A it holds that
V (E(A)) = V (E(A)), so that player 1 expects to get exactly the amount
V (E(A)). This leads to the definition of the value of the matrix game,
V (A) := V (E(A)) = V (E(A)). If the players cannot use probability distri-
butions on their strategies, we get the lower value
V (A) := max
i∈M
min
j∈N
aij
of the matrix game and its upper value
V (A) := min
j∈N
max
i∈M
aij .
In general, V (A) < V (A). Note that V (A) ≤ V (A) ≤ V (A) for all matrices
A.
We denote the set of real matrices by A. The value function V : A → R
associates with each matrix A ∈ A its value V (A). The value function is
an example of a an evaluation function, which we define as a real-valued
function f : A → R that assigns to every matrix A ∈ A a real number re-
flecting the evaluation of the matrix game A from the point of view of player
1. The value function was characterized as an evaluation function in Vilkas
(1963), whose characterization was extended to a broader class of zero-sum
games in Tijs (1981). As the value function can only be applied in situations
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where mixed strategies can be used by the players, we are interested in the
evaluation function based on the lower value. We axiomatically characterize
this evaluation function and also provide new characterizations for the value
function.
We start by recalling Vilkas’s (1963) characterization of the value func-
tion. He used the following four properties of an evaluation function f :
A → R.
A1 Objectivity. f([a]) = a for all a ∈ R.2
A2 Monotonicity. For all A,B ∈ A, if A ≥ B, then f(A) ≥ f(B).
A3 Row dominance. The ith row of the matrix A, denoted
ri = [ai1, . . . , ain],
is dominated if there exists a convex combination x of the other rows
of A3 with the property that xj ≥ aij for all j ∈ N . For any A ∈ A, if
row r is dominated, then f(A) = f(A \ r), where A \ r represents the
matrix obtained from A by deleting row r.
A4 Symmetry. f(−AT ) = −f(A) for all A ∈ A.
Objectivity establishes the evaluation for player 1 in a trivial situation
where both players have exactly one strategy available. Monotonicity states
that the evaluation for player 1 should not decrease when his payoff weakly
increases for every possible choice of strategies by both players. Row domi-
nance states that player 1’s evaluation should not change if he can no longer
choose a strategy that is worse for him than some combination of other
strategies. Note that this property makes sense only in a setting where
players can mix their strategies. Symmetry establishes that the roles of
players 1 and 2 can be interchanged if the matrix is adapted accordingly.
2Here, [a] denotes the 1× 1 matrix with a11 = a.
3x is a convex combination of the other rows if there exist (αk)k∈M\i such that αk ≥ 0
for each k ∈M \ i, with Pk∈M\i αk = 1, and x =Pk∈M\i αkrk.
6
Transposing the matrix interchanges the roles of the players and the minus
sign appears because the payoff of player 2 is the opposite of that of player
1.
Theorem 1 (Vilkas (1963)) The value function V is the unique evalua-
tion function that satisfies objectivity (A1), monotonicity (A2), row domi-
nance (A3), and symmetry (A4).
The counterpart for player 2 to row dominance would be what we call
column dominance, which is related to dominated strategies of player two.
A5 Column dominance. The jth column of the matrix A, denoted
cj = [a1j , . . . , amj ], is dominated if there exists a convex combination y
of the other columns of A with the property that yi ≤ aij for all i ∈M .
For any A ∈ A, if column c is dominated, then f(A) = f(A\ c), where
A \ c represents the matrix obtained from A by deleting column c.
Column dominance states that player 1’s evaluation should not change if
player 2 can no longer choose a strategy that is dominated for him by some
combination of his other strategies. Note that player 2 wants to minimize
the payoff of player 1 (thereby maximizing his own payoff), so a strategy for
player 2 is dominated if it always gives a (weakly) larger payoff to player 1.
Column dominance is the flip side of row dominance and can in fact replace
symmetry in the characterization of the value function.
Theorem 2 The value function V is the unique evaluation function that
satisfies objectivity (A1), monotonicity (A2), row dominance (A3), and col-
umn dominance (A5).
Proof. It follows from Theorem 1 that V satisfies A1, A2, and A3. To see
that V satisfies A5, note that if c is a dominated column in A, then this
column becomes a dominated row in the matrix −AT and can be eliminated
by A3. Symmetry assures that we can switch from the matrix to the negative
of its transpose and back after the elimination of the dominated row to
obtain the matrix A \ c.
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To show unicity, let f : A → R be an evaluation function satisfying A1,
A2, A3, and A5 and fix a matrix A = [aij ]i∈M,j∈N ∈ A. Because V (A) =
V (E(A)), there exists a mixed strategy of player 1 that guarantees player
1 a payoff of at least V (A). Then, using A3, we can add a dominated row
in which all elements equal V (A) to the matrix without changing the value.
Similarly, using that V (A) = V (E(A)) and A5, we can add a dominated
column in which all elements equal V (A) without changing the value. Hence,
f(A) = f(

a11 . . . a1n
...
. . .
...
am1 · · · amn
V (A) · · · V (A)
) = f(

a11 · · · a1n V (A)
...
. . .
...
...
am1 · · · amn V (A)
V (A) · · · V (A) V (A)
).
Now, we use A2 to make all the elements of the matrix less than or equal
to V (A). This makes all the rows but the last one dominated. Hence, we
can use A3 (repeatedly) to one by one eliminate all rows but the last one.
Then we have a 1× n+1 matrix left in which all elements equal V (A). We
subsequently use A5 (repeatedly) to eliminate all but one of the columns of
the remaining matrix. This leaves us with a 1× 1 matrix, to which we can
apply A1. Doing so, we obtain
f(

a11 · · · a1n V (A)
...
. . .
...
...
am1 · · · amn V (A)
V (A) · · · V (A) V (A)
) ≥
f(

min {a11, V (A)} · · · min{a1n, V (A)} V (A)
...
. . .
...
...
min{am1, V (A)} · · · min{amn, V (A)} V (A)
V (A) · · · V (A) V (A)
) =
f ([V (A), . . . , V (A)]) = f ([V (A)]) = V (A).
Making all the elements of the matrix more than or equal to V (A), and
using A2, A5, A3, and A1, respectively, we derive in a similar manner that
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f(

a11 · · · a1n V (A)
...
. . .
...
...
am1 · · · amn V (A)
V (A) · · · V (A) V (A)
) ≤
f(

max {a11, V (A)} · · · max{a1n, V (A)} V (A)
...
. . .
...
...
max{am1, V (A)} · · · max{amn, V (A)} V (A)
V (A) · · · V (A) V (A)
) =
f(
 V (A)...
V (A)
) = f ([V (A)]) = V (A).
Putting together all the (in)equalities that we have derived, we obtain that
f(A) = V (A). This shows the value function V is the only evaluation
function that satisfies A1, A2, A3, and A5. 2
Theorems 1 and 2 show that symmetry and column dominance are equiv-
alent in the presence of objectivity, monotonicity, and row dominance. How-
ever, this equivalence does not hold in general. For example, the evaluation
function defined by f(A) = a11, for all A ∈ A, satisfies symmetry (as well
as objectivity and monotonicity) but does not satisfy column dominance (or
row dominance).
Row dominance and column dominance state that the elimination of a
dominated strategy of player 1 or 2 has no effect on the evaluation of player
1. A natural question at this point is what the effect is of the elimination of
an arbitrary strategy, dominated or not. The following two properties deal
with this question.
A6 Row elimination. f(A) ≥ f(A\r) for any row r of A and all A ∈ A.
A7 Column elimination. f(A) ≤ f(A\ c) for any column c of A and all
A ∈ A.
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Row elimination states that player 1’s evaluation should not increase
when a strategy of player 1 is eliminated. Basically, it means that player
1 cannot be better off when his possibilities are further restricted. Column
elimination states that the same is true for player 2; as player 2’s payoff is
the opposite of that of player 1, player 1’s evaluation should not decrease
when a strategy of player 2 is eliminated. It is not hard to see that the value
function satisfies both row elimination and column elimination. These two
properties highlight that the value function satisfies a form of monotonicity
with respect to the elimination of strategies. The question arises whether
monotonicity could be replaced by row elimination and column elimination
in the previous results. The answer is affirmative.
Theorem 3 The value function V is the unique evaluation function that
satisfies objectivity (A1), row dominance (A3), column dominance (A5),
row elimination (A6), and column elimination (A7).
Proof. We already established that V satisfies A1, A3, and A5. To see that
it also satisfies A6 and A7, it suffices to note that taking the maximum over
a smaller set leads to a weakly smaller value and that taking the minimum
over a smaller set leads to a weakly larger value.
The proof of unicity is analogue to that in Theorem 2. Let f : A → R
be an evaluation function that satisfies the five properties and let A =
[aij ]i∈M,j∈N . Then, by A3 and A5 we have
f(A) = f(

a11 . . . a1n
...
. . .
...
am1 · · · amn
V (A) · · · V (A)
) = f(

a11 · · · a1n V (A)
...
. . .
...
...
am1 · · · amn V (A)
V (A) · · · V (A) V (A)
).
Using A6, A5 and A1, respectively, we obtain
f(

a11 · · · a1n V (A)
...
. . .
...
...
am1 · · · amn V (A)
V (A) · · · V (A) V (A)
) ≥ f ([V (A), . . . , V (A)])
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= f ([V (A)]) = V (A).
In a similar way, using A7, A3 and A1, respectively, we have
f(

a11 · · · a1n V (A)
...
. . .
...
...
am1 · · · amn V (A)
V (A) · · · V (A) V (A)
) ≤ f(
 V (A)...
V (A)
) = f ([V (A)]) = V (A).
We conclude that f(A) = V (A). 2
Monotonicity is a very different property from column elimination and
row elimination, even though it can be replaced by these two properties in
characterizing the value function. Monotonicity deals with a matrix of the
same dimensions in which the elements change, whereas row and column
elimination deal with matrices of changing dimension. The same example
as we used before, the evaluation function f with f(A) = a11 for all A ∈
A, satisfies monotonicity but does not satisfy column elimination or row
elimination.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the lower value function
V : A → R, which assigns to every matrix A ∈ A its lower value V (A). The
main advantage of the lower value function is that it does not assume that
the players have preferences over lotteries; it only considers pure strategies
of the matrix game. Because of this reason, this evaluation function is more
appropriate to apply to wider classes of two-person zero-sum games.
To try and better understand the lower value function, we first ask our-
selves which ones of the axioms used by Vilkas (1963) are satisfied by this
evaluation function. Obviously, the lower value function does satisfy objec-
tivity and monotonicity. However, the following two examples show that it
does not satisfy row dominance or symmetry.
Example 1 Consider the two matrices
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A =
(
5 0
1 4
)
and A′ =
 5 01 4
3 2
 .
Note that A′ is obtained from A by adding a row that is a convex combination
of the other rows, namely 12 times the first row plus
1
2 times the second one.
To find the lower value of A, note that player 1 gets at least 0 if he chooses
the first row, whereas he gets at least 1 if he chooses the second row. Hence,
V (A) = 1. Similarly, we derive that V (A′) = 2. Hence, the elimination
of the dominated third row from A′ changes the lower value and this is a
violation of row dominance.
Example 2 Consider the matrices A and −AT below.
A =
(
2 0
1 2
)
−AT =
( −2 −1
0 −2
)
It holds that V (A) = 1 and V (−AT ) = −2, which illustrates that V does not
satisfy symmetry.4
The lower value does satisfy the following property, which is a weaker
form of row dominance.
A8 Weak row dominance. The ith row of the matrix A, denoted ri =
[ai1, . . . , ain], is strongly dominated if there exists a row rk (k 6= i) in the
matrix that is weakly larger than row ri, i.e., akj ≥ aij for all j ∈ N .
For any A ∈ A, if row r is strongly dominated, then f(A) = f(A \ r).
Note that every row that is strongly dominated is also dominated but
that the reverse is not necessarily true. Therefore, every row that can be
eliminated under weak row dominance can also be eliminated under row
dominance but not the other way around. Hence, weak row dominance is a
weaker property than row dominance.
4Note that V (A) = 4
3
, which is obtained by player 1 playing the first row with proba-
bility 1
3
and the second row with probability 2
3
. Also, V (−AT ) = − 4
3
, which is obtained
by player 1 playing the first row of −AT with probability 2
3
and its second row with
probability 1
3
.
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In addition to objectivity, monotonicity, and weak row dominance, the
lower value function satisfies column dominance. However, taking into ac-
count Theorem 2, it is clear that these four properties cannot characterize
the lower value function. We need a property that is satisfied by the lower
value function but not by the value function. Strong colunm dominance is
such a property.
A9 Strong column dominance. The jth column of the matrix A, de-
noted cj = [a1j , . . . , amj ], is weakly dominated if for every i ∈M there
exists an other column ck (k 6= j) such that aik ≤ aij . For any A ∈ A,
if column c is weakly dominated, then f(A) = f(A \ c).
Weak domination of a column is a fairly weak requirement. It means
that for every row, there is another column which has a weakly lower value
in that row than the weakly dominated column does. Note that this can
be a different column for every row. Because a column that is dominated
is also weakly dominated, strong column dominance is a stronger property
than column dominance. This stronger property is satisfied by the lower
value function, which in fact can be characterized using this property. It is
not satisifed by the value function.5
Theorem 4 The lower value function V is the unique evaluation function
that satisfies objectivity (A1), monotonicity (A2), weak row dominance (A8),
and strong column dominance (A9).
Proof. It is easily seen that V satisfies A1 and A2. To see that V satis-
fies A8, note that if row ri is strongly dominated by row rk in matrix A,
then minj∈N aij ≤ minj∈N akj . Hence, player 1 does not need row ri to
reach the maximum of these expressions, which equals V (A). To see that V
satisfies A9, note that if column cj is weakly dominated in matrix A, then
5To see this directly, consider, for example, the matrix A =

3 0 1
0 3 1

, in which
the third column is weakly dominated. However, the deletion of this column changes the
value from 1 to 1 1
2
.
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mink∈N aik = mink∈N\j aik for every i ∈ M . Hence, deleting this column
does not change the lower value.
To prove that there is no other evaluation function that satisfies A1,
A2, A8, and A9, let f : A → R be an evaluation function satisfying these
properties and take a matrix A = [aij ]i∈M,j∈N ∈ A. Suppose, without loss
of generality, that V (A) is the element in the ith row and the jth column.
First, we use A2 to make all the rows strongly dominated by the ith row.
Then we apply A8 (repeatedly) to delete all the other rows. We are then
left with a 1× n matrix consisting of the ith row of A. Because V (A) = aij ,
we know that aik ≥ aij for all k ∈ N . Hence, in the 1 × n matrix that we
have left, all columns different from the jth are weakly dominated and can
be eliminated by A9. Then we can apply A1. Doing this, we obtain
f(A) ≥ f(
 min{a11, ai1} · · · min{a1n, ain}... . . . ...
min{am1, ai1} · · · min{amn, ain}
) =
f([ai1, . . . , ain]) = f([aij ]) = aij = V (A).
To show that f(A) ≤ V (A), we first add a column to the matrix A in
which all elements are equal to V (A). Note that such a column is weakly
dominated, so by A9, this addition will not alter the lower value. Then
we apply A2 to make all columns weakly dominated by the newly added
one, after which we use A9 again (repeatedly) to eliminate all these other
columns. We are then left with am×1 matrix in which all elements are equal
to V (A), in which all rows are strongly dominated so that we can eliminate
all but one of them by A8. Application of A1 finishes the following sequence.
f(A) = f(
 a11 · · · a1n V (A)... . . . ... ...
am1 · · · amn V (A)
) ≤
f(
 max{a11, V (A)} · · · max{a1n, V (A)} V (A)... . . . ... ...
max{am1, V (A)} · · · max{amn, V (A)} V (A)
) =
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f(
 V (A)...
V (A)
) = f([V (A)]) = V (A).
We have shown that f(A) = V (A), which proves that the lower value V is
the unique evaluation function that satisfies A1, A2, A8, and A9. 2
Like in the characterization of the value function, monotonicity can be
substituted by column elimination and row elimination in Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 The lower value function V is the unique evaluation function
that satisfies objectivity (A1), row elimination (A6), column elimination
(A7), weak row dominance (A8), and strong column dominance (A9).
Proof. We already established that V satisfies A1, A8, and A9. To see that
it also satisfies A6 and A7, it suffices to note that taking the maximum over
a smaller set leads to a weakly smaller value and that taking the minimum
over a smaller set leads to a weakly larger value.
The proof of unicity is analogue to that in Theorem 4. Let f : A → R
be an evaluation function that satisfies A1, A6, A7, A8, and A9 and let
A = [aij ]i∈M,j∈N ∈ A. Suppose, without loss of generality, that V (A) is the
element in the ith row and the jth column. Then, applying A6, A9 and A1,
respectively, we obtain
f(A) ≥ f([ai1, . . . , ain]) = f([aij ]) = aij = V (A).
Using A9, A7, A8, and A1, we obtain
f(A) = f(
 a11 · · · a1n V (A)... . . . ... ...
am1 · · · amn V (A)
) ≤ f(
 V (A)...
V (A)
) =
f([V (A)]) = V (A).
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This proves that f(A) = V (A). 2
We conclude this section with some comments on two properties that we
did not encounter in the characterization results above, but that naturally
come to mind.
A10 Weak column dominance. The jth column of the matrix A, denoted
cj = [a1j , . . . , amj ], is strongly dominated if there exists a column ck
(k 6= j) in the matrix that is weakly larger than column cj , i.e., aik ≤
aij for all i ∈ M . For any A ∈ A, if column c is strongly dominated,
then f(A) = f(A \ c).
A11 Strong row dominance. The ith row of the matrix A, denoted
ri = [ai1, . . . , ain], is weakly dominated if for every j ∈ N there exists
an other row rk (k 6= i) such that aij ≤ aik. For any A ∈ A, if row r
is weakly dominated, then f(A) = f(A \ r).
These properties are the counterparts to weak row dominance and strong
column dominance. Column dominance implies weak column dominance and
strong row dominance implies row dominance. Hence, both the value func-
tion and the lower value function satisfy weak column dominance because
they both satisfy column dominance. The lower value function does not sat-
isfy strong row dominance because it does not satisfy row dominance. The
value function does not satisfy strong row dominance either, as can be seen
by considering the matrix A =
 3 00 3
2 2
, in which the third row is weakly
dominated. However, the deletion of this row changes the value from 2 to
112 .
In the following table we provide an overview of the various properties
that we have encountered in this section and for each property we indicate
whether it is satisfied (X) by the value function and the lower value function
or not (−).
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V V
Objectivity X X
Monotonicity X X
Symmetry X −
Row elimination X X
Column elimination X X
Weak row dominance X X
Row dominance X −
Strong row dominance − −
Weak column dominance X X
Column dominance X X
Strong column dominance − X
3 Characteristic functions associated with strate-
gic games.
In this section, we consider methods to associate a characteristic function
with each strategic game. We consider the method defined in von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944), which is based on the value function, and we also
introduce a new method based on the lower value function. We provide
axiomatic foundations for both methods, based on our axiomatizations of
the value function and the lower value function. We remind the reader that
the motivation for considering methods to associate a characteristic function
with each strategic game is to tackle those situations in which players can
act outside the rules of the strategic game, which only describes the actions
available to each of the players and their payoff functions, but does not
detail all their cooperative possibilities. We start by providing the necessary
definitions.
A strategic game g = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) consists of a set of players
N = {1, . . . , n}, and for every player i ∈ N a set of strategies Xi available
to this player, and a payoff function ui :
∏
j∈N Xj → R. In this paper we
consider only finite strategic games6, which are those games in which the
6However, some results we obtain can easily be extended to wider classes of strategic
games.
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strategy sets {Xi}i∈N are all finite. The class of finite strategic games with
player set N is denoted by GN . We denote the class of all finite strategic
games by G.
A coalitional game is a pair (N, v), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of
players and v : 2N → R is the characteristic function of the game, assigning
to each coalition S ⊂ N its worth v(S). The worth v(S) of a coalition S
represents the benefits that this coalition can guarantee its members inde-
pendently of what the other players (those in N \ S) do. By convention,
v(∅) = 0. From now on, we identify a coalitional game (N, v) with its char-
acteristic function v. We denote the class of coalitional games with player
set N by ΓN and we use Γ to denote the class of all coalitional games. A
coalitional game v ∈ ΓN is said to be superadditive if v(S∪T ) ≥ v(S)+v(T )
for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N with S ∩ T = ∅.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) propose the following procedure
to associate a coalitional game with every strategic game. Let g ∈ GN be a
strategic game and take a non-empty coalition S ⊂ N , S 6= N . The 2-person
zero-sum game gS is defined by
gS = ({S,N \ S}, {XS , XN\S}, {uS ,−uS}),
where, for all T ⊂ N , XT =
∏
i∈T Xi and uT =
∑
i∈T ui. In this game, there
are two players, coalition S and coalition N \ S. The strategies available
to each of these two coalitions are all the combinations of the strategies
available to its members in the game g. The payoff to coalition S is the
sum of the payoffs of its members for every possible strategy tuple, and the
payoff to coalition N \ S is the opposite of this. Note that the game gS is
essentially a matrix game. We denote by AS the matrix of this game. Now,
in the coalitional game vg ∈ ΓN associated with the strategic game g, the
worth of coalition S is the value of this matrix game;
vg(S) = V (AS).
This is the worth that the coalition S can secure for itself even if the players
in N \ S cooperate to keep the worth of coalition S as low as possible. The
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worth of the grand coalitionN is simply defined as vg(N) = maxx∈XN uN (x).
The interpretation of vg is that the players in a coalition S assume that all
the players who are not in the coalition will coordinate their strategy choices
to try and keep the payoff to S as small as possible. Note that the value of
AS is defined using the mixed extension of the matrix game AS , so that it
is implicitly assumed that the players in a coalition cannot only coordinate
their pure strategies, but can even choose a probability distribution over
their coordinated strategies. This is a very strong assumption.
The philosophy underlying von Neumann and Morgenstern’s procedure is
intimately connected to the characteristic function concept. Since the char-
acteristic function provides the benefits that every coalition can guarantee
its members, independently of what the other players do, von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s procedure seems to be a sensible one, at least in situations in
which coalitions of players have preferences over lotteries and in which their
utility functions are linear.
However, in settings in which mixing coordinated strategies is not possi-
ble or reasonable, it is more appropriate to stick to pure strategies and the
lower value of the matrix game. This leads us to associate with a strategic
game g ∈ GN the coalitional game wg ∈ ΓN defined by
wg(S) = V (AS)
for all non-empty S ⊂ N , S 6= N , and wg(N) = maxx∈XN uN (x). Note that
this coalitional game is more pessimistic than von Neumann and Morgen-
stern’s, in the sense that wg(S) ≤ vg(S) for all g ∈ GN and all S ⊂ N .7 We
illustrate both games in the following example.
Example 3 Consider the following three-player strategic game g, in which
player 1 is the row player, player 2 the column player, and player 3 chooses
the matrix to the left or that to the right.
α3 α2 β2
α1 (1, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0)
β1 (0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1)
β3 α2 β2
α1 (0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1)
β1 (1, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0)
7This follows from V (A) ≤ V (A) for all matrices A.
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First, consider the coalition S = {1}. The matrix of the 2-person zero-
sum game associated with this coalition is AS =
(
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
)
, where the
rows are ordered as before and the columns are ordered as follows. The first
column corresponds to the strategies (α2, α3) by N \ S = {2, 3}, the second
column to (β2, α3), the third column to (α2, β3), and the fourth column to
(β2, β3). The value of this matrix is V (AS) = 12 and its lower value equals
V (AS) = 0. Hence, we find that vg(1) = 12 and wg(1) = 0.
8 Applying the
same procedure to the coalitions {2} and {3}, we find vg(2) = vg(3) = 12 and
wg(2) = wg(3) = 0.
Now, let us consider a 2-player coalition, say S = {1, 2}. The ma-
trix of the 2-person zero-sum game associated with this coalition is AS =
2 0
0 2
0 2
2 0
 , where the columns correspond to the strategies α3 and β3 (from
left to right) of player 3 ∈ N \ S and the rows are ordered as follows. The
first row corresponds to the strategies (α1, α2) by the players in S, the second
row to (β1, α2), the third row to (α1, β2), and the fourth row to (β1, β2). The
value of this matrix is V (AS) = 1 and its lower value equals V (AS) = 0.
Hence, we find that vg(1, 2) = 1 and wg(1, 2) = 0. Applying the same proce-
dure to the coalitions {1, 3} and {2, 3}, we find vg(1, 3) = vg(2, 3) = 1 and
wg(1, 3) = wg(2, 3) = 0.
For the grand coalition, we find vg(N) = wg(N) = 3.
This example illustrates that in general the two coalitional games vg and
wg are different and also that wg(S) ≤ vg(S) for all coalitions S ⊂ N .
Note that the games vg and wg that we derived in the previous example
are both superadditive. This is not a coincidence, but holds for all coalitional
games derived in the described manner from strategic games using the value
or the lower value. For the games vg this was shown in von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944) and for the games wg we show this in the following
8Note that we omit the set-brackets { and } around 1. This is often done in the
literature and we adopt this convention.
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Proposition.
Proposition 1 For every strategic game g ∈ GN it holds that the associated
coalitional game wg is superadditive.
Proof. Let g = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) ∈ GN be a strategic game and take
two non-empty coalitions S, T ⊂ N , such that S ∩ T = ∅. Then
wg(S ∪ T ) = max
xST∈XS∪T
min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
uS∪T (xST , x−ST )
= max
xS∈XS
max
xT∈XT
min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
uS∪T (xS , xT , x−ST ).
Now, fix a yS ∈ XS and a yT ∈ XT . We can now derive that
wg(S ∪ T ) ≥ min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
uS∪T (yS , yT , x−ST )
≥ min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
uS(yS , yT , x−ST ) + min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
uT (yS , yT , x−ST )
≥ min
xT∈XT
min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
uS(yS , xT , x−ST )
+ min
xS∈XS
min
x−ST∈XN\(S∪T )
uT (xS , yT , x−ST )
= min
x−S∈N\S
uS(yS , x−S) + min
x−T∈N\T
uT (yT , x−T ).
We can use this to derive that
wg(S ∪ T ) ≥ max
xS∈XS
min
x−S∈N\S
uS(xS , x−S) + max
xT∈XT
min
x−T∈N\T
uT (xT , x−T )
= wg(S) + wg(T ).
This proves that wg is superadditive. 2
The two games vg and wg in example 3 are not only superadditive, but
also have non-empty cores. The core of a coalitional game (N, v) consists of
divisions of the payoff v(N) for the grand coalition in which each coalition
S ⊂ N of players gets at least their worth v(S). In example 3 we found
that vg(N) = wg(N) = 3. If we divide this equally among the three players,
21
giving them 1 each, then every single player gets at least his worth (which is
1
2 in the game vg and 0 in the game wg) and every 2-player coalition gets 2,
whereas its worth in vg equals 1 and that in wg equals 0. Hence, this equal
division is in the core of both games. It is not true in general, however,
that the games vg and wg have non-empty cores. This is illustrated in the
following example.
Example 4 Consider the following three-player strategic game g, in which
player 1 is the row player, player 2 the column player, and player 3 chooses
the matrix to the left or that to the right.
α3 α2 β2
α1 (1, 1, 0) (0, 0, 0)
β1 (1, 0, 1) (1, 0, 1)
β3 α2 β2
α1 (1, 1, 0) (0, 1, 1)
β1 (0, 0, 0) (0, 1, 1)
Following the procedure as explained in detail in example 3, we derive
that
vg(i) = wg(i) = 0 for each i ∈ N ,
vg(i, j) = wg(i, j) = 2 for each pair i, j ∈ N ,
and vg(N) = wg(N) = 2.
Note that in any core-division of the worth vg(N) = wg(N) = 2, each
individual player would have to get no less than 0 and any two players should
get at least 2 together. It is clearly impossible to meet all these conditions si-
multaneously. Hence, the cores of the games (N, vg) and (N,wg) are empty.
We continue this section by characterizing the two methods to associate
a coalitional game with every strategic game. We define a method in gen-
eral as a map φ : G→ Γ that associates a coalitional game φ(g) ∈ ΓN with
every strategic game g ∈ GN . We denote the von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1944) method by ΨV and our method by ΨV . Hence, ΨV (g) = vg
and ΨV (g) = wg for all g ∈ GN . To characterize these two methods, we
use properties that are derived from the properties we used in section 2 to
characterize the value function and the lower value function.
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B1 Individual objectivity. For every g ∈ GN , if a player i ∈ N is such
that ui(x) = c, for all x ∈ XN , then φ(g)(i) = c.
B2 Monotonicity. If g = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) ∈ GN and
g′ = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (u′i)i∈N ) ∈ GN
are two strategic games such that ui ≥ u′i for some player i ∈ N , then
for this player i it holds that φ(g)(i) ≥ φ(g′)(i).
B3 Irrelevance of dominated strategies. In a game g ∈ GN , a strat-
egy xi ∈ Xi of player i is dominated if there exists a convex combi-
nation y of the other strategies of player i, with the property that
ui(xi, xN\i) ≤ ui(y, xN\i)9 for all xN\i ∈ XN\i. For any g ∈ GN and
player i ∈ N , if strategy xi ∈ Xi is dominated, then φ(g)(i) = φ(g′)(i),
where g′ ∈ GN is the game that is obtained from g by deleting strategy
xi.
B4 Irrelevance of strongly dominated strategies. In a game g ∈ GN ,
a strategy xi ∈ Xi of player i is strongly dominated if there exists a
strategy x′i ∈ Xi, x′i 6= xi, such that ui(x′i, xN\i) ≥ ui(xi, xN\i) for all
xN\i ∈ XN\i. For any g ∈ GN and player i ∈ N , if strategy xi ∈ Xi
is strongly dominated, then φ(g)(i) = φ(g′)(i), where g′ ∈ GN is the
game that is obtained from g by deleting strategy xi.
B5 Irrelevance of dominated threats. In a game g ∈ GN , a strategy
xj ∈ Xj of a player j is a dominated threat to player i 6= j if there
exists a convex combination y of the other strategies of player j, with
the property that ui(y, xN\j) ≤ ui(xj , xN\j) for all xN\j ∈ XN\j . For
any g ∈ GN and players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, if strategy xj ∈ Xj is a
dominated threat to player i, then φ(g)(i) = φ(g′)(i), where g′ ∈ GN
is the game that is obtained from g by deleting strategy xj .
9ui(y, xN\i) :=
P
xˆi∈Xi y(xˆi)ui(xˆi, xN\i), where y =
P
xˆi∈Xi y(xˆi)xˆi. Note that
y(xi) = 0, y(xˆi) ≥ 0, for all xˆi ∈ Xi, and Pxˆi∈Xi y(xˆi) = 1. Observe that y is sim-
ply a mixed strategy of player i.
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B6 Irrelevance of weakly dominated threats. In a game g ∈ GN , a
strategy xj ∈ Xj of a player j is a weakly dominated threat to player
i 6= j if for every xN\j ∈ XN\j there exists a strategy x′j ∈ Xj , x′j 6= xj ,
such that ui(x′j , xN\ j) ≤ ui(xj , xN\ j). For any g ∈ GN and players
i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, if strategy xj ∈ Xj is a weakly dominated threat to
player i, then φ(g)(i) = φ(g′)(i), where g′ ∈ GN is the game that is
obtained from g by deleting strategy xj .
Individual objectivity states that if player i gets the same payoff for any
possible strategy tuple, then in the associated coalitional game the worth
of the coalition consisting of player i only is equal to this amount. Mono-
tonicity states that the worth of player i in the associated coalitional game
does not decrease if his payoff in the strategic game weakly increases for
all possible strategy tuples. Irrelevance of dominated strategies and irrel-
evance of strongly dominated strategies mean that a player’s worth in the
coalitional game does not change if in the strategic game he loses the abil-
ity to use a strategy that was weakly worse for him than another one of
his (mixed) strategies. Irrelevance of dominated strategies and irrelevance
of strongly dominated strategies are derived from row dominance (A3) and
weak row dominance (A8), respectively. Correspondingly, irrelevance of
dominated strategies implies irrelevance of strongly dominated strategies
but not the other way around. Irrelevance of dominated threats and ir-
relevance of weakly dominated threats are derived from column dominance
(A5) and strong column dominance (A9), but they are adapted to be used in
games with more than two players. They state that a player i’s worth in the
associated coalitional game is not affected if another player j is prohibited
from using a strategy whose deletion does not change player i’s worst-case
scenario. Irrelevance of weakly dominated threats is the stronger property of
the two, as every threat that is dominated is also weakly dominated. Both
irrelevance of dominated strategies and irrelevance of dominated threats
make sense only in an environment where it is reasonable to assume that
players can use mixed strategies, whereas irrelevance of strongly dominated
strategies and irrelevance of weakly dominated threats are more adequate
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in situations in which players can only use pure strategies. To understand
the relevance of properties B3 through B6, note that the worth of a player
in the game φ(g) is interpreted as the payoff that this player can guarantee
himself.
We need one additional property that has no equivalent in our char-
acterizations of the (lower) value. It appears because we have to consider
coalitions consisting of more than one player in the setting of the current
section. We need some additional notation to introduce this property. Let
g = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) ∈ GN and S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅. To study the opportu-
nities of the members of S as a group, we introduce a new player p(S) with
strategy setXp(S) := XS and utility function up(S) :
∏
j∈(N\S)∪{p(S)}Xj → R
defined by up(S)(xN\S , xp(S)) = uS(xN\S , xS) for all xN\S ∈ XN\S and all
xp(S) = xS ∈ XS = Xp(S). Denote N(S) := (N \ S) ∪ {p(S)}. The game
g(S) ∈ GN(S) is defined by g(S) = (N(S), {Xi}i∈N(S), {ui}i∈N(S)). The
property merge invariance states that the worth of coalition S in the orig-
inal strategic game g is the same as that of player p(S) in the game g(S).
Its interpretation is that a coalition of players cannot influence its worth by
merging and acting as one player. Its validity derives from the very inter-
pretation of a coalition in a coalitional game as a group of players acting in
the best interests of the group.
B7 Merge invariance. Let g = (N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) ∈ GN and S ⊂ N ,
S 6= ∅. Then φ(g)(S) = φ(g(S))(p(S)), where g(S) is the strategic
game that is obtained from g by considering the coalition S as a single
player.
The properties introduced above can be used to axiomatically charac-
terize the two methods ΨV and ΨV . We only provide a proof of one of the
following theorems, as their structure is similar to the proofs of Theorems 2
and 4, respectively, and providing one proof suffices to illustrate the role of
the extra property merge invariance.
Theorem 6 The method ΨV is the unique method satisfying individual ob-
jectivity (B1), monotonicity (B2), irrelevance of dominated strategies (B3),
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irrelevance of dominated threats (B5), and merge invariance (B7).
Theorem 7 The method ΨV is the unique method satisfying individual ob-
jectivity (B1), monotonicity (B2), irrelevance of strongly dominated strate-
gies (B4), irrelevance of weakly dominated threats (B6), and merge invari-
ance (B7).
Proof. First, we show that ΨV satisfies the five properties. Let g ∈ GN
and i ∈ N be such that ui(x) = c, for all x ∈ XN . Then, in the matrix Ai of
the game gi, all entries are equal to c. The lower value of this matrix equals
c. Hence, ΨV (g)(i) = wg(i) = c, which shows that ΨV satisfies B1.
Now, let g = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) ∈ GN and g′ = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (u′i)i∈N ) ∈
GN be two strategic games such that ui ≥ u′i for player i ∈ N . Then,
Ai ≥ A′i, where Ai denotes the matrix of the game gi and A′i denotes the
matrix of the game g′i. It now follows from monotonicity of the lower value
function that ΨV (g)(i) = wg(i) ≥ wg′(i) = ΨV (g′)(i). This proves that ΨV
satisfies B2.
To see that ΨV satisfies B4, note that if strategy xi for player i is strongly
dominated in the game g ∈ GN , then it corresponds to a strongly dominated
row in the matrix Ai of the game gi. Hence, by weak row dominance of the
lower value function, it holds that ΨV (g)(i) = wg(i) = wg′(i) = ΨV (g′)(i),
where g′ ∈ GN is the game that is obtained from g by deleting strategy xi.
To see that ΨV satisfies B6, note that if strategy xj ∈ Xj of a player
j is a weakly dominated threat to player i 6= j in the game g ∈ GN , then
for all xN\i,j ∈ XN\i,j strategy (xj , xN\i,j) corresponds to a weakly domi-
nated column in the matrix Ai of the game gi. Hence, using strong column
dominance of the lower value function (repeatedly), we can eliminate the
strategy (column) (xj , xN\i,j) for each xN\i,j ∈ XN\i,j , without changing
the lower value. The matrix that we have left is that corresponding to the
game g′ ∈ GN that is obtained from g by deleting strategy xj . For this
game, we then have ΨV (g)(i) = wg(i) = wg′(i) = ΨV (g′)(i).
It follows easily that ΨV satisfies B7 by noting that the matrix AS of
the strategic game gS derived from g and the matrix Ap(S) of the strategic
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game g(S)p(S) derived from g(S) are, in fact, the same.
We now proceed to show that any method satisfying the five proper-
ties must coincide with ΨV . Let φ : G → Γ be a method satisfying indi-
vidual objectivity, monotonicity, irrelevance of strongly dominated strate-
gies, irrelevance of weakly dominated threats, and merge invariance. Take
a finite strategic game g = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) ∈ GN and fix a non-
empty coalition S ⊂ N . If S = N , then merge invariance, irrelevance of
strongly dominated strategies, and individual objectivity clearly imply that
φ(g)(N) = wg(N) = ΨV (g)(N). Assume now that S 6= N . We will prove
that φ(g)(S) = wg(S) = ΨV (g)(S) has to hold.
Consider the game g(S) = (N(S), {Xi}i∈N(S), {ui}i∈N(S)) that is ob-
tained from g by considering the coalition S as a single player p(S). Because
φ satisfies merge invariance, we know that φ(g)(S) = φ(g(S))(p(S)).
We know from the definition of g(S) that the matrix AS of the strategic
game gS derived from g and the matrix Ap(S) of the strategic game g(S)p(S)
derived from g(S) are the same. From this we can conclude that wg(S) =
V (AS) = V (Ap(S)) = wg(S)(p(S)). Now, let x¯ = (x¯i)i∈N ∈
∏
i∈N Xi be a
strategy such that the lower value of AS is obtained in the row corresponding
to strategy x¯S for coalition S and the column corresponding to strategy x¯N\S
for coalition N \ S. Then the lower value of Ap(S) is obtained in the row
corresponding to strategy x¯p(S) = x¯S ∈ Xp(S) for player p(S) and the column
corresponding to strategy x¯N\S for coalition N \ S.
Let g1 be the game that is obtained from the game g(S) by bounding
the utility of player p(S) from above by wg(S), i.e.,
g1 = (N(S), {Xi}i∈N(S), {ui}i∈N\S , u′p(S)),
where N(S) = (N \ S) ∪ {p(S)} and
u′p(S)(xN\S , xp(S)) = min{uS(xN\S , xS), wg(S)}
for all xN\S ∈ XN\S and all xp(S) = xS ∈ XS = Xp(S). Because φ satisfies
monotonicity, we know that φ(g(S))(p(S)) ≥ φ(g1)(p(S)).
Now, note that wg(S) = maxxp(S)∈Xp(S) minxN\S∈XN\S up(S)(xp(S), xN\S)
is obtained at (x¯p(S), x¯N\S), so that minxN\S∈XN\S up(S)(x¯p(S), xN\S) = wg(S)
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and up(S)(x¯p(S), xN\S) ≥ wg(S) for all xN\S ∈ XN\S . Hence,
u′p(S)(x¯p(S), xN\S) = wg(S)
for all xN\S ∈ XN\S . Moreover, we have u′p(S)(xp(S), xN\S) ≤ wg(S) for all
xN\S ∈ XN\S and all xp(S) ∈ Xp(S). Hence, every strategy xp(S) ∈ Xp(S),
xp(S) 6= x¯p(S), is strongly dominated by strategy x¯p(S). Because φ satisfies
irrelevance of strongly dominated strategies, we can eliminate all the strongly
dominated strategies of player p(S) without changing the worth of p(S) in
the image of the game under φ. Hence, φ(g1)(p(S)) = φ(g2)(p(S)), where
g2 is the game that is obtained from g1 by deleting all strategies of player
p(S) except strategy x¯p(S).
Now, in the game g2, for every player j 6= p(S) it holds that every
strategy xj ∈ Xj \ x¯j is a weakly dominated threat to player p(S), because
u′p(S)(x¯p(S), x¯N\S) = minxN\S∈XN\S u
′
p(S)(x¯p(S), xN\S).
10 Because φ satisfies
irrelevance of weakly dominated threats, we can eliminate all the weakly
dominated threats to player p(S) without changing the worth of p(S) in the
image of the game under φ. Hence, φ(g2)(p(S)) = φ(g3)(p(S)), where g3 is
the game that is obtained from g2 by deleting all strategies xj ∈ Xj \ x¯j for
every player j ∈ N \ S.
In the game g3 every player j has exactly one strategy, x¯j . Hence, for
this game we can use individual objectivity of φ to derive that
φ(g3)(p(S)) = u′p(S)(x¯).
Putting everything together, we see that we proved that φ(g)(S) =
φ(g(S))(p(S)) ≥ φ(g1)(p(S)) = φ(g2)(p(S)) = φ(g3)(p(S)) = u′p(S)(x¯) =
wg(S) = ΨV (g)(S).
To finish the proof of the Theorem, we need to prove that φ(g)(S) ≤
ΨV (g)(S).
Consider again the game g(S) = (N(S), {Xi}i∈N(S), {ui}i∈N(S)) that is
obtained from g by considering the coalition S as a single player p(S). We
have already seen that φ(g)(S) = φ(g(S))(p(S)) and wg(S) = wg(S)(p(S)).
10In fact, u′p(S)(x¯p(S), x¯N\S) = u
′
p(S)(x¯p(S), xN\S) = wg(S) for all xN\S ∈ XN\S .
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We will define a new game g4 by adding a strategy x∗i 6∈ Xi for each player
i ∈ N \ S. The strategies x∗i are introduced as additional threats to player
p(S). We add these strategies one by one. Without loss of generality, we
assume that N \ S = {1, 2, . . . , k}, where k denotes the number of players
in N \ S.
We first define the game g∗1, by adding strategy x∗1 for player 1. The
payoffs to player p(S) in the game g∗1 are as in the game g(S) when player
1 plays a strategy x1 ∈ X1. When player 1 plays his strategy x∗1, then the
payoffs to player p(S) are defined by
u1p(S)(xp(S), x
∗
1, (xi)i∈{2,3,...,k}) = min
x1∈X1
{up(S)(xp(S), x1, (xi)i∈{2,3,...,k})},
where xi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , k} and xp(S) ∈ Xp(S). In the game g∗1, it
holds that strategy x∗1 is a weakly dominated threat to player p(S). Because
φ satisfies irrelevance of weakly dominated threats, we can eliminate this
weakly dominated threat to player p(S) from g∗1 without changing the worth
of p(S) in the image of the game under φ. This shows that φ(g∗1)(p(S)) =
φ(g(S))(p(S)).
Now, let 2 ≤ j ≤ k and suppose that we have added a strategy x∗i for
each player i = 1, 2, . . . j − 1 and defined the corresponding games g∗i with
payoff functions uip(S) for player p(S) so that in each game g
∗
i strategy x
∗
i is
a weakly dominated threat to player p(S) and φ(g∗i )(p(S)) = φ(g(S))(p(S)).
To obtain the game g∗j , we add a strategy x
∗
j for player j and define the
payoffs to player p(S) to be as in the game g∗j−1 when player j plays a
strategy xj ∈ Xj , and when player j plays his strategy x∗j they are
ujp(S)(xp(S), (yi)i∈{1,...,j−1}, x
∗
j , (xi)i∈{j+1,...,k}) =
min
xj∈Xj
{uj−1p(S)(xp(S), (yi)i∈{1,...,j−1}, xj , (xi)i∈{j+1,...,k})},
where yi ∈ Xi∪{x∗i } for all i ∈ {1, . . . , j−1}, xi ∈ Xi for all i ∈ {j+1, . . . , k},
and xp(S) ∈ Xp(S). In the game g∗j , it holds that strategy x∗j is a weakly
dominated threat to player p(S). Because φ satisfies irrelevance of weakly
dominated threats, we can eliminate this weakly dominated threat to player
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p(S) from g∗j without changing the worth of p(S) in the image of the game
under φ. This shows that φ(g∗j )(p(S)) = φ(g
∗
j−1)(p(S)) = φ(g(S))(p(S)).
The game g4 is the game g∗k which emerges from the procedure described
above after a strategy x∗i has been added for each player i ∈ N \ S. The
payoffs to player p(S) in the game g4 are denoted by u′p(S) := u
k
p(S). We
have that φ(g4)(p(S)) = φ(g(S))(p(S)). Also, it holds that
u′p(S)(xp(S), (x
∗
i )i∈N\S) =
ukp(S)(xp(S), (x
∗
i )i∈N\S) = min
xk∈Xk
{uk−1p(S)(xp(S), (x∗i )i∈{1,...,k−1}, xk)} =
min
xk∈Xk
min
xk−1∈Xk−1
{uk−2p(S)(xp(S), (x∗i )i∈{1,...,k−2}, xk−1, xk)} =
. . . = min
xN\S∈XN\S
up(S)(xp(S), xN\S) ≤ wg(S)(p(S))
for all xp(S) ∈ Xp(S). We will use this later.
Let g5 be the game that is obtained from the game g4 by bounding the
utility of player p(S) from below by wg(S), i.e., the payoff function of player
p(S) is u′′p(S)(xp(S), yN\S) = max{u′p(S)(xp(S), yN\S), wg(S)} for all xp(S) ∈
Xp(S) and all yN\S ∈
∏
i∈N\S Xi ∪ {x∗i }. Because φ satisfies monotonicity,
we know that φ(g5)(p(S)) ≥ φ(g4)(p(S)).
Now, note that the game g5 has been constructed in such a way that
u′′p(S)(xp(S), x
∗
i , yN\(S∪i)) = minxi∈Xi u
′′
p(S)(xp(S), xi, yN\(S∪i)) for all i ∈ N\S,
all xp(S) ∈ Xp(S), and all yN\(S∪i) ∈
∏
j∈N\(S∪i)Xj ∪ {x∗j}. Hence, ev-
ery strategy xi ∈ Xi is a weakly dominated threat to player p(S) for every
player i 6= p(S). Because φ satisfies irrelevance of weakly dominated threats,
we can eliminate all the weakly dominated threats to player p(S) without
changing the worth of p(S) in the image of the game under φ. Hence,
φ(g5)(p(S)) = φ(g6)(p(S)), where g6 is the game that is obtained from g5
by deleting all strategies xi ∈ Xi for every player i ∈ N \ S.
In the game g6 all players i 6= p(S) have only one strategy, strategy x∗i ,
and as u′p(S)(xp(S), (x
∗
i )i∈N\S) ≤ wg(S)(p(S)) = wg(S), it holds that
u′′p(S)(xp(S), (x
∗
i )i∈N\S) = max{u′p(S)(xp(S), (x∗i )i∈N\S), wg(S)} = wg(S)
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for every xp(S) ∈ Xp(S). Hence, the conditions for individual objectivity are
satisfied and we can conclude that φ(g6)(p(S)) = wg(S).
Putting everything together, we see that we proved that φ(g)(S) =
φ(g(S))(p(S)) = φ(g4)(p(S)) ≤ φ(g5)(p(S)) = φ(g6)(p(S)) = wg(S) =
ΨV (g)(S).
This finishes the proof. 2
We already pointed out that irrelevance of dominated strategies implies
irrelevance of strongly dominated strategies and that irrelevance of weakly
dominated threats implies irrelevance of dominated threats. Hence, The-
orems 6 and 7 allow us to conclude that ΨV does not satisfy irrelevance
of weakly dominated threats and that ΨV does not satisfy irrelevance of
dominated strategies.
Analogously to our characterizations in section 2, we can replace the
monotonicity property in Theorems 6 and 7 by the two following properties.
B8 Elimination of own strategies. For every strategic game g ∈ GN ,
every player i ∈ N , and every strategy xi ∈ Xi, it holds that φ(g)(i) ≥
φ(g′)(i), where g′ ∈ GN is that game that is obtained from g by
deleting strategy xi.
B9 Elimination of others’ strategies. For every strategic game g ∈
GN , any two players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, and every strategy xj ∈ Xj ,
it holds that φ(g)(i) ≤ φ(g′)(i), where g′ ∈ GN is that game that is
obtained from g by deleting strategy xj .
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